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OHIO COURT QUESTIONS CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
REQUIREMENT OF SENATORIAL ADVISE AND
CONSENT
State, ex rel. Burns v. DiSalle, Governor
172 Ohio St. 363, 176 N.E.2d 428 (1961)
The respondent, the Governor of Ohio, appointed Harry Hoffheimer to
the State Racing Commission. Pursuant to state law, the governor reported
the appointment for confirmation to the Senate. However, the Senate
adjourned without taking action on the appointment. The relator alleged
in his petition that since the Senate had failed to advise and consent to
the appointment of Hoffheimer, a writ of mandamus should issue com-
pelling the governor to make a new appointment. Respondent's second
defense was "that any provision of Section 3769.02 which makes or purports
to make such appointment contingent upon the advice and consent of the
Senate is unconstitutional and void as making the General Assembly a
participant in the appointing power in contravention of Section 27 Article
II of the Ohio Constitution."' The Supreme Court of Ohio unanimously
held section 3769.02 to be repugnant to Article II, Section 27 of the Ohio
Constitution.
The problems involved in the decision raise policy questions which
plagued the founders of this country in 1787 and which have continued to
be a source of dispute to the present time. These policy questions involve
the extent to which a system of checks and balances should modify the
underlying privilege of separation of powers, and, more specifically, the
proper extent of legislative participation in the appointment of executive
officers.
The framers of the Ohio Constitution attempted to resolve the specific
problem by inserting the provision that:
The election and appointment of all officers, and the filling of all
vacancies, not otherwise provided for by this Constitution, or the
Constitution of the United States, shall be made in such manner
as may be directed by law; but no appointing power shall be
exercised by the General Assembly, except as prescribed in the
Constitution and in the election of United States senators; and in
these cases the vote shall be taken 'viva voce.' 2
The phraseology of this section is ambiguous in several respects, but
in the instant case only two terms are of primary importance. The term
"appointing power" was in dire need of interpretation, and the supreme
court, to a certain extent, obliged. The court came to the conclusion that
I State, ex rel. Burns v. DiSalle, Governor, 172 Ohio St. 363 (1961). Respondent's
first defense was that since the appointment of Hoffheimer had been submitted to the
Senate for confirmation or rejection he had fully complied with his obligations under
the law.
2 Ohio 'Const. art. 2, § 27.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
the requirement of senatorial advice and consent for confirmation of an
appointment to state office is an integral part of the appointing power
itself, as that term is used in the constitution, and, as such, is repugnant
to that instrument. The only case cited by the court in support of its
decision was State ex rel. Attorney General v. Kennon.3 That case defined
"appointing power" as follows:
The phrase 'appointing power,' as here used, is one of no ambiguous
signification. When employed in reference to matters pertaining to
government, or to the distribution of the powers of government,
it means the power of appointment of office-the power to select
and indicate by name individuals to hold office, and to discharge
the duties and exercise the powers of officers. 4
This definition certainly connotes the idea that in order to have the
appointing power, a governmental unit must have the power to "select and
indicate by name" who shall "discharge the duties and exercise the powers
of officers." Does the statutory requirement of senatorial advice and consent
confer such power on the General Assembly? The answer of course depends
upon the meaning of "advice and consent." If that phrase means that the
Senate shall convene with the governor and they shall choose a name
suitable to both, then it can be construed as a part of the appointing power,
and if the Senate in this situation corresponds to the General Assembly, a
statute requiring such advice and consent is void under the constitution.
If, on the other hand, "advice and consent" is to be considered as a
confirmation and, in effect, acts only as a negative check on the nomination
of the governor, then the Senate does not have the power to "select and
indicate by name individuals. . . ." Assuming this construction, confirma-
tion does not fall within the definition of appointing power as set forth in
the Kennon opinion. The latter construction seems to be widely accepted.5
An interpretation finding no constitutional objection to a requirement
that the Senate advise and consent is plausible only if the distinction between
appointing power and confirmation is conceded, and the requirement of
advice and consent is considered solely as a confirmation. That both of
these premises are considered valid is manifested by several constitutions
of other states. 6 These provide that the governor shall nominate, and by
3 State, ex rel. Attorney General v. Kennon, 7 Ohio St. 546 (1857). It should be
noted that in this case the term "appointing power" was discussed in relation to a
completely different question, i.e. whether the General Assembly had the power to
select men to sit as a board for the purpose of appointing the directors of the state
penitentiary and the state house commissioners.
4 Id. at 556.
G See State, ex rel. Allen v. Ferguson, Aud. 155 Ohio St. 26, 33, 97 N.E.2d 660
(1951) where the terms "advice and consent" and "confirmation" are impliedly used
synonymously. See People ex rel. MacMahon v. Davis, 284 Ill. 439, 120 N.E. 326 (1918)
and 44 0. Jur.2d 49 (1960) where it is stated that "a confirmation of an appointment to
a public office is to be distinguished from the appointment itself, for in confirming the
appointment the Senate or other body does not in any sense choose the appointee."
0 Ill. Const. Art. 5, § 10, which reads: "The governor shall nominate, and by and
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and -with. the advice and consent of the senate appoint officers, while in
the same sentence declaring that no such officers shall be appointed by the
legislature. It is manifest that the framers of these other state constitu-
tions did not consider senatorial advice and consent as synonymous
with the appointing power which was expressly denied to the legislature.
If the term advice and consent were so construed to be a part of the
appointing power, these provisions would make no sense whatsoever.
The problem involved could not arise under the United States Constitu-
tion for there is no provision in that document explicitly denying to the
Senate the power to appoint. The President is given the power to nominate,
and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint certain
important officers. However, the Congress may vest the appointment of
such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone.7 "The
object of this provision is to confer on the president a power which he would
not othernise have possessed,"" but whatever the object, the effect of the
provisiori is to give the Senate a negative check on the appointing powers
of the President.
Turning to an analysis of the history preceding the constitutional
provision and the purpose behind its adoption, the question becomes one
of the effect which the members of the constitutional convention intended
article II, sec., 27 to have upon the appointing power of the General
Assembly. The Kennon opinion states that the existence of legislative
patronage was a prominent mischief to be corrected at the constitutional
convention. It was generally believed that the members of the legislature
made a practice of exchanging votes for offices. In order to accomplish the
desired result of eliminating this practice, did the committee on revision
intend the phrase "no appointing power" to destroy the confirming power
in the Senate?
Three reasons support a negative answer to this question. First, a
body having only a negative check upon the nomination of another-that is
a body which does not have the power to select, by name, individuals to
fill appointive offices-is not in a position to exchange such offices for votes.
Second, if the predominant theme of the constitutional convention
was to restrict the possibility of corruption in the state government, it would
seem strange that the committee would be so willing to give such unbridled
power to one person where the working of corruption, if he so desired, would
be infinitely easier.
Third, the available legislative history indicates that although the
framers intended to eliminate the appointing power in the General Assembly,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint all officers whose offices are es-
tablished by this constitution, or which may be created by law, and whose appointment
or election is not otherwise provided for; and no such offices shall be appointed by the
General Assembly." See also N.J. Const. Art. 4, 5, and Art. 1, 12.
7 U.S. Const. Article II, § 2.




they had no intention of similarly eliminating the confirming power in
the Senate.P
The fact remains that the Supreme Court of Ohio elected to ignore
the distinction between the terms "appointing power" and "confirmation"
to hold unconstitutional a requirement of Senate advice and consent. Possibly
it was the actual intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention
of 1851 to begin in Ohio the growing movement to reorganize state
administration by taking from the Senate the power of confirmation; or
perhaps the Ohio court was prompted to rule as it did by the recent trend
toward vesting more authority in the executive branch. If the decision was
rested upon policy considerations, the attempt by the court to become the
state's philosopher was abortive. On November 7, 1961, the voters of Ohio,
by approving a proposed amendment to the constitution which would
require the governor to submit his nominations to the senate for approval,
demonstrated that they are as yet not ready to relinquish this check on
the power of the executive branch.
o In explanation of the intent of the framers of this provision the Kennon court
quotes Mr. Reemelin, the man who drew up the reports of the committee on the legis-
lative department, as saying the purpose of the committee to be "that no appointing
power-not the least vestige-would be left to the General Assembly." The court in
the instant case evidently assumes this to mean that the intent was that not even the
power of confirmation would be left to the Senate. However, this interpretation seems
questionable in light of the fact that Mr. Reemelin, only three lines above the preceding
quotation, stated that "he did not know but he would be willing to authorize the legis-
lature to give this appointing power to the Governor, to be exercised by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate or the General Assembly; but he desired to take away
from the General Assembly all power to create offices, for the sake of filling them with
MEMBERS OF THEIR OWN BODY. He was willing that the General Assembly
should exercise all legitimate powers, but he desired to prevent them from grasping
further." 1 Ohio Debates 259.
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